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Guns and Commerce in Dialectical Perspective 
Thomas Lundmark • 
The philosophy of Hegel envisions a world-soul that can be known 
through the dialectical method of logic. 1 The dialectical method of logic 
is founded upon the negation of contradictions or, said another way, the 
reconciliation of opposites. 2 According to this method, one concept or 
event (thesis) inevitably produces its opposite (antithesis). The tension 
between these opposites generates a new category (synthesis). This new 
category can be said to unify the opposites in a way that, in a sense, pre-
serves them while at the same time abolishes them, thereby avoiding their 
self-contradictoriness. 3 
The world-soul animates world and national history, including the 
legal history reflected in constitutions, laws, and the acts of public institu-
tions4 such as courts. The sequence of dialectical logic is the same as the 
sequence of history. Thus history can be explained as a teleological pro-
cess aimed at unfolding the dialectical sequence of concepts and events. 5 
In Hegelian terms, the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez v. United 
States6 marks the intersection of two dialectical progressions, one judicial 
* Professor of Law, University of Munster, Germany. Dr. jur., Unive.rsity of Bonn, 
Germany; J.D. University of California, Berkeley. 
1. THE NEW COUIMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 757 (1975). The German term rendered as "world-
soul" is Weltgeist. 
2. Friedrich Hogemann & Walter Jaeschke, Die Wissenschaft der Logik, in HEGEL: 
EINFtJHRUNG IN SEINE PHILOSOPH!E 75, 84 et seq. (Otto Poggeler ed. 1977). 
3. Michael Forster, Hegel's Dialectical Method, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEGEL 
130, 146-4 7 (1995). 
4. Manfred Baum & Kurt Rainer Meist, Recht-Politik-Geschichte, in HEGEL: EINFDHRUNG 
IN SEL"'E PH!LOSOPH!E 106, 106 (Otto Poggeler ed. 1977). 
5. !d. at 136. 
6. Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The literature on Lopez is expanding 
rapidly. Some of the many treatments are Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable 
Limit to Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause?, 44 KAN. L. REV. 217 (1996), 
criticized in Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 KAN. L. REV. 243 (1996). See also Dailey, 
infra note 1 31 ; Regan, infra note 14 7; Cahn, infra note 131 ; Comment, infra note 146; Daniel A. 
Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the 
Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615 (1995); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too 
Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS 
L.J. 979 (1995); Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, 
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 695 (1996); 
Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996); Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
801 (1996); Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995); 
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and one legislative. The frrst progression is the evolution of judicial 
construction on the reach of the interstate commerce clause7 as a source 
of federal legislative jurisdiction. Here the narrow thesis (buying and sell-
ing across state lines8) was replaced by its expansive antithesis (every-
thing is interstate commerce9) only to give way in Lopez to its synthesis 
(economic activity with a substantial interstate effect10). The second dia-
lectical progression is legislative. Federal gun control legislation has pro-
gressed from its original thesis (right to bear arms11 ) to an antithesis: a 
ban in all places on the sale of certain weapons (e.g., automatic 
weapons12) or a ban of all weapons in certain places (e.g., school yards13). 
The resulting synthesis manifests itself in the five-day waiting period 
(temporary ban) for the purchase of all weapons (Brady Bil114). 
These two progressions (legislative and judicial) are themselves vari-
ations on the underlying theme of the evolution of federal-state balance. 
Orchestrated by state and federal legislatures, courts, politicians, and vot-
ers, the original foundational thesis (state sovereigntyl5) composed its 
theoretical opposite: New Deal legislation. 16 The variety of federal and 
Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996); Renee M. Landers, Federalization of State Law: Enhancing 
Opportunities for Three-branch and Federal-state Cooperation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 811 (1995); 
William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (1995); Stephen 
M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. 
L. REv. 1 (1995). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 
8. See discussion infra notes 83 through 92. 
9. See discussion infra notes 93 through 103. 
10. See discussion infra notes 104 through 119. 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second Amendment's right to bear arms is used as a 
shorthand term for a more complex history and cluster of issues briefed infra notes 41 through 4 7. 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994), see discussion infra note 48. 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994), see discussion infra note 106. 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994), see discussion infra note 52. 
15. The Tenth Amendment (U.S. CONST. amend. X, quoted infra note 31) serves in this 
article as a shorthand for the state-sovereignty thesis. The term "sovereignty" is employed to refer 
to those unarticulated powers ("states' rights") that belong exclusively to state regulatory 
jurisdiction. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("The Constitution created a 
Federal Government of limited powers .... The States thus retain substantial sovereign authority 
under our constitutional system."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 
(1985) ("The States unquestionably do 'retain a significant measure of sovereign authority' ... 
to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred 
those powers to the Federal Government" (citation omitted)). The term is used advisedly. See 
Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After 
Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 346 (arguing that the word is inappropriate to American 
federalism). 
16. The importance of New Deal legislation and the judicial responses to it are discussed 
in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994). See 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40, 47-50, 105-30 (1991). According to 
Professor Ackerman, the events of 1937 constitute a revolution that "ends in the constitutional 
triumph of the activist welfare state." !d. at 40. See generally BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, 
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state gun control laws and judicial interpretation is the cacophonous syn-
thesis of the discordant extremes of state and federal domination. 
The discussion begins by tracing the legislative evolution of federal 
gun control measures (Part A-1 through Part A-3), culminating in a re-
flection on where the next legislative antithesis will likely sprout (Part A-
4). Attention is focused on three potential avenues of legislative advance-
ment: amendment to the constitution, passage of a gun control law re-
stricted to commerce, and employment of the congressional taxing or 
spending powers. Despite the availability of these avenues, the author 
concludes that the political forces that arouse legislative activity are too 
weak and diffuse to sire vigorous antithetical action by Congress in the 
near future, in part because handguns do not pose a threat to the vast ma-
jority of non-Black Americans. 17 
The discussion then tracks the dialectical development of judicial 
construction of the interstate commerce clause that gave birth to Lopez 
(Part B). The author sketches the judicial development in outline form to 
highlight the conceptual forces at work in forging the synthetic reasoning 
of Lopez (Part B-1 through Part B-3). The author then applies this reason-
ing to probe the constitutionality of other commerce clause enactments, 
such as those regulating the environment and governing families, to di-
vine the future of the judicial progression (Part B-4). The author per-
ceives the emergence of a synthesis that is weightier than Lopez and that 
might better be described as a historical progression buried on a deeper 
stratum. This is cognition of the value of localism, known in Europe as 
the principle of subsidiarity. 18 
I. LEGISLATIVE GUN CONTROL MEASURES 
The Lopez case raises the issue of the extent of the legislative power 
of the federal government of the United States. This power is delegated 
by article 1 section 1 of the Constitution to the Congress. This article of 
the Constitution also contains a catalogue of legislative powers, which 
include the powers to declare war, 19 to coin money,20 to operate post offi-
ces,21 to raise and support armies,22 to grant copyrights and patents,23 to 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (1984) (discussing the realist legacy of the New Deal). 
17. See discussion infra notes 64 through 67. 
18. Subsidiarity is discussed infra notes 146 through 160. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
20. Id. art. I, § 8, c1. 5. 
21. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
22. Jd. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
23. !d. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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establish uniform bankruptcy rules, 24 to impose federal excise taxes, 25 to 
spend for the general welfare,26 to regulate citizenship matters,27 and to 
regulate foreign commerce and commerce between the states.Z8 
In order to stress that the federal government-unlike the govern-
ments of the states-was a government of delegated powers, the Consti-
tution was amended with the Tenth Amendment in 1791 29 which consists 
of the tautological30 sentence: "The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people."31 
The spending power32 is probably the most important,33 at least since 
1913 when, upon ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Congress 
received power to levy income taxes. 34 According to the spending power, 
24. !d. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
25. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
28. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
29. /d. amend. X. For a general discussion of the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
see, e.g., Martha Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a 
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985); Rapaczynski, supra note 15; William W. Van 
Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 769. 
30. Justice O'Connor in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). See United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, Ill (1940) (upholding sections of Fair Labor Standards Act as 
within scope of regulation of interstate commerce). Justice Stone, delivering the opinion of the 
Court in Darby, wrote: 
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment. ... The amendment 
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is 
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory 
of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been 
established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was 
other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise 
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their 
reserved powers. 
/d. at 123-24. 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
32. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 1. The commerce clause has gained in importance in part 
because regulations under the commerce clause, unlike those under the spending clause, enable the 
imposition of criminal penalties. Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federal-
ization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 274 (1973); see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 137 (12th ed. 1991). 
33. These do not just include outlays for defense, which make up one-fifth of the federal 
budget, but also for social programs. Just three of these federal social programs-Social Security 
(retirement), Medicare (medical care for the aged and handicapped), and Medicaid (medical care 
for the poor)-are responsible for one-third of the federal budget. David Hage et al., Facing the 
Fiscal Facts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 22, 1995, at 51. Other social programs which 
are based on the federal spending power include Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) and Food Stamps (coupons with which to buy foodstuffs). Five million families with 9 
million children received AFDC in 1994. Robert J. Samuelson, Welfare Can't Be Reformed, 
NEWSWEEK, March 27, 1995 at 47. Over 27 million US residents, i.e., over 10 percent of the 
population, received Food Stamps in October 1994. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRJB., Dec. 30, 1994 at AS. 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
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Congress may spend money for the general welfare: "The Congress shall 
have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises, to pay 
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of 
the United States."35 While many commentators,36 including the author, 37 
advocate rigorous review of federal inducements to the states under the 
spending clause, the Supreme Court accords Congress wide discretion, 38 
contenting itself with a lax, four-part inquiry: (1) Does the inducement 
promote the general welfare; (2) Is it clear and unambiguous in what it 
requires and in the consequences from non-participation; (3) Is the in-
ducement related to a federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs; and (4) Does it avoid transgressing constitutional provisions 
that may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration." The Sixteenth Amendment overturned Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and repealed Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of 
the Constitution, which had stated that "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless 
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." 
The Sixteenth Amendment effectively gave the national government unlimited control of the 
nation's wealth and a virtually unlimited spending power. Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union 
to National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
PoL'Y 129, 130-31 (1993). 
35. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
36. E.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 15; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending 
and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1131 (1987) ("If the front door of the commerce 
power is open, it may not be worth worrying whether to keep the back door of the spending power 
tightly closed"). Other treatments include Th0mas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional 
Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine 
of Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. 
L. REV. 289 (1984); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L. J. 1 (1994); Lynn A. 
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1911, 1929 (1995); Note, 
Tower of Power: South Dakota v. Dole and the Strength of the Spending Power, 49 U. Pm. L. 
REV. 1097 (1988); Note, The Surface Transportation Assistance Act: Federalism's l.11st Stand?, 
11 VT. L. REV. 203, at 212-13, 230 (1986). 
37. Lundmark, infra note 109, at 424, (advocating use of the three-part test of Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) for federal measures that 
directly bind the states: (1) Does the measure regulate the states as states; (2) Does it address 
matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty; and (3) Does it directly impair the 
ability of states to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental concern. ld. at 
286-87). Two renowned constitutional scholars doubt the need for judicial review of states' rights 
issues. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954) 
(contending that the states can effectively protect their own interests through the national political 
process) and Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis the States: The 
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE. L.J. 1552, 1560 (1977) ("Numerous structural aspects 
of the national political system serve to assure that states' rights will not be trampled, and the 
lesson of practice is that they have not been."). 
38. TRmE, infra note 103, at 475 n.1: "Congress can, [after Dole], achieve by way of its 
spending power much of what the twenty-first amendment may deny it the ability to achieve 
through its commerce power." See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 150-51 
(1993). 
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funds. 39 Because of the laxity of this standard, Congress can, under the 
present state of judicial review, financially encourage all activity which it 
rationally believes to be in the national interest. 40 
A. Right to Bear Arms and the lOth Amendment: The Thesis 
An explication of the federal regulation of firearms can begin with 
this proclamation of the Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed. "41 While commentators are 
almost42 universal in opining that the right to bear arms is not a personal 
right but rather a right enjoyed by each state to arm a militia,43 one cannot 
dispute the fact that there was no federal regulation of firearms for over a 
century. Tlms it seems warranted for the purposes of historic analysis to 
identify the thesis (lack of regulation) with the Second Amendment's 
right to bear arms. This being done, it would seem that minor, indirect 
incursions into the right to bear arms-those that do not challenge the 
essence or validity of the right-should be seen as recapitulations or even 
revalidations of the right (thesis) rather than as contradictions to it. The 
National Firearms Act of 193444 should be viewed in this non-antithetical 
way, for it merely imposed a tax on the disposition of certain weapons. 45 
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196846 also does not 
undermine the thesis (lack of regulation), for this legislation merely re-
quires a federal business perrnit to import, manufacture, and sell weapons 
and munitions, even if the business is not involved in interstate com-
merce.47 
39. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). 
40. Federal grant~ to states and localities have constituted an increasingly large proportion 
of total state and local revenues, increasing from 11 percent in 1950 to 20 percent in 1991. See 
U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 2 S!GNIF1CANT FEATURES OF 
FISCAL FEDERALISM, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, 56, tbl. 23 (1992). See Lewis B. Kaden, 
Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judic.ial Role, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 847, 871-72 (1979) 
(tracing development of federal offers of funds to the states from their beginnings in the early 
1800's). 
41. U.S. CoNST. amend. II. 
42. For a contrary view, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 
YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
43. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 247 (1989). No court has ever recognized a personal 
constitutional right to bear arms. Andrew D. Herz, Constitutional False Consciousness and Dere-
Liction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U.L. REV. 57, 58 (1995). 
44. I.R.C. §§ 5801-5872, 48 Stat. 1236-40. 
45. This law has as its constitutional base the federal taxing power (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1) and is therefore not affected by the Lopez decision, which applies to commerce clause 
regulations. 
46. Pub. L. No. 90-351. 
47. This law directly affects commerce and substantially (if indirectly) affects interstate 
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B. Prohibitions: The Antithesis 
The antithesis to firearm freedom finally emerged with the 1988 ma-
chine gun banning amendment to the Firearm Owners' Protection Act48 
and with the federal49 assault weapons ban. 50 Both the machine gun and 
assault weapons bans qualify for consideration as antithetic legislative 
pronouncements because they contradict the thesis that an individual's 
right to possess a 11rearm is absolute. 
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the constitutionality of 
the machine gun prohibition. However, in 1991 the Supreme Court re-
fused discretionary review in the case of Farmer v. Higgins. 51 That case 
concerned a plaintiff who wanted to construct a machine gun himself, but 
who was denied a permit to do so by the appropriate federal agency, the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. From the denial of review one 
might conclude that the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutional-
ity of the machine gun prohibition if confronted with the question di-
rectly. In any event, both the machine gun and assault weapon bans 
should survive challenge under Lopez because the bans against ownership 
are coupled with prohibitions against disposition and acquisition, which 
are commercial transactions. 
C. A Waiting Period: The Synthesis 
A form of synthesis between the thesis (absolute freedom) and antith-
esis (prohibition) is seen in the provisions of the Brady Bil1.52 Enacted in 
1993, the Brady Bill requires a five-day waiting period before buying a 
weapon. 53 In Hegelian terms, this waiting-period approach can be thought 
of as the unification of opposites (absolute freedom and prohibition) in a 
commerce. fulfilling the requirement~ of the Lopez decision. 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994): "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess 
a machine-gun." The courts have interpreted the law not to forbid the ownership and sale of 
weapons manufactured and registered before May 19, 1986, when the law took effect. See States 
v. Rock Island Armory, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 117, 119 (C.D. Ill. 1991) and Farmer v. Higgins, 907 
F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 104 (1991). 
49. As far as state legislation is concerned, California's prohibition against attack weapons 
was upheld in Fresno Ritle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 731 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Similar prohibitions can be found in 1993 Conn. Acts 93-306; and 1990 N.J. Laws 32. In Virginia 
one may only purchase one gun per month. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(Q) (Michie Supp. 
1994). 
50. Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-924 
(1994). 
51. Farmer v. Higgin.~. 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 104 (1991). 
52. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994). 
53. It also requires the chief law enforcement officer of each state to do a background check 
on each prospective buyer. "A chief law enforcement officer ... shall make a reasonable effort 
to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun by the prospective 
buyer] would be in violation of the law, ... " !d. 
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way that, in a sense, preserves them while at the same time abolishing 
them. 54 
While the Lopez rationale does not threaten the constitutionality of 
the Brady Bill, the law is nevertheless unconstitutional for another rea-
son. Under our system of federalism, the federal legislature should not be 
able to give orders to the state parliaments and governments and in that 
way turn them into agencies of the federal government. 55 A monetary in-
centive would, however, be constitutional. It would encourage, rather 
than require, the states to join a nationwide system of background 
checks. 56 
Another bill presently pending before the Congress also possesses the 
synthetic quality of the Brady Bill because it too combines the opposites 
of freedom and prohibition. This is the Gun Violence Prevention Act,57 
also referred to as Brady II. If enacted, this bill would require that each 
purchaser of a weapon obtain a license. 58 If this weapons-licensing pro-
gram were to be financed by the federal government, then it would be 
constitutional as an expenditure for the common good under Congress's 
spending power.59 Incentives, such as tinancial support for implementa-
tion and enforcement, could be offered to the states to encourage them to 
enact new or extend existing legislation. However, the bill takes another 
tack: it would require the states to establish and enforce the weapons-li-
censing program with no incentives. As such, the law would be unconsti-
tutional under constitutional interpretation predating the Lopez decision. 60 
D. Future of the Legislative Progression 
Hegel's theory implies that those who take the first steps in creating a 
new social order cannot predict what future society will be like because 
54. See text supra note 3. 
55. Congress may not simply "commandeer ... the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelhng them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'' New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation A~s·n. 
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). See Note, Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of the 
Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 151 (1994) and ca.•es discussed, including 
United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev 'd sub nom. United State.~ v. 
Osteen, 30 F. 3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-6640 (Oct. 24, 1994). 
56. See the discussion of the congressional spending power supra notes 32 through 40. See 
also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
57. Gun Violence Prevention Act, S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
58. Under this bill, all handgun buyers must possess a handgun card, a nationally uniform 
license issued through the states. This card will be issued after a thorough background check. 
including fingerprints. Applicants for a card must complete a basic ftrearrns safety course, and 
must pass a test. The card would he issued by the states following uniform minimum standards 
issued by the Secretary of the Trea.~ury. Id. 
59. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See discussion supra notes 32 through 40. 
60. See supra notes 32 through 40 (discussing congressional spending power). See also New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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they lack knowledge of the spirit necessary to understand how the new 
society will actualize the nature of the world-soul. 61 Nevertheless, we still 
might be able to identify, for instance, the main social problems in the 
present order and the social movement that will bring the new order into 
being.62 
The magnitude of the gun control problem-and, indeed, whether or 
not it really is a problem-is subject to serious controversy. The contro-
versy has nothing to do with the Second Amendment's right to bear arms, 
but rather with the question whether the flood of weapons can be stopped 
and whether doing so will have any appreciable effect on the rates of vio-
lent crime, accidental homicide, and murder and manslaughter. 
Many Americans are alarmed by the fact that the American murder 
and manslaughter rate is twice that of France and Germany; yet these 
rates are, in turn, twice the rate in Great Britain,63 and people in France 
and Germany do not seem to be alarmed. The ease of acquisition of a 
weapon does not entirely explain these statistical differences. On the 
other hand, a gunshot is certainly more life-threatening than, say, a knife 
wound. If handguns were less readily available, one would expect a re-
duction in gun-inflicted injuries and fatalities. 
Some of the American ambivalence64 toward gun control regulation is 
undoubtedly attributable to the fact that the vast majority of Americans 
are not personally affected by the high murder and manslaughter rates. 
The simple fact is that the murder and manslaughter rates among the non-
Black population are not particularly high. Approximately fifty percent of 
all victims of murder and manslaughter are Black. 65 Further, murder and 
manslaughter are often associated with drug dealing, with which the vast 
majority of the population has no contact. In other words, for the vast ma-
jority of the population, the risk of being the victim of murder or man-
slaughter is quite low. Traffic accidents, HIV, and suicide all claim more 
victims than crime.66 Statistically, one's chances of reaching old age are 
61. Allen W. Wood, Hegel and Marxism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEGEL 414, 
439 (1995). Even Marx, who saw the downfall of capitalism and the victory of the working class 
as inevitable, stopped short of writing "recipes for the cookshops of the future." !d. at 440. 
62. /d. 
63. Herz, supra note 43, n.3 at 58. 
64. Another popular argument is that the activities of the powerful gun lobby prevent 
actualization of the public will. E.g., Herz, supra note 43, at 112. The author believes that the 
popular will is simply not strong enough to change the status quo. 
65. 1995 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORT FOR THE US, tbl. 2.4, at 14. 
66. In 1992 traffic accidents claimed 41,710 lives, HIV killed 33,590, and suicide accounted 
for 29,760 deaths. Homicide and legal intervention accounted for 29,570 fatalities. SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 9, 1997, at A-4, col. 5. 
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just as good in the United States as in Europe,67 and this despite floods, 
earthquakes, and tornadoes. 
If Congress wished to revive the Gun-Free School Zones Act or enact 
more expansive gun control legislation, such as in England,68 it could fol-
low one of three paths. First, it could recommend to the states that the 
Constitution be amended to give the Congress legislative jurisdiction to 
enact the law. Second, Congress could fit the legislation into one of the 
three Lopez categories (channels of commerce, instrumentalities, or sub-
stantial effect of economic activity on interstate commerce). Third, Con-
gress could entice the states into enacting legislation by offering incen-
tives. These three possibilities are addressed in order. 
1. Constitutional Amendment 
To amend the United States Constitution requires first that both 
houses of Congress, by two-thirds majority, vote to recommend an 
amendment. The amendment takes effect upon ratification by the legis-
latures of three-fourths of the states. 69 
Three precedential amendments to the United States Constitution, all 
of which followed unpopular decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, might be mentioned. The infamous case of Dredd Scott v. Sand-
for~0 concerned a federal law which prohibited slavery in certain areas. 
The Supreme Court determined that the Congress lacked jurisdiction to 
enact the law, because slavery was a municipal matter, i.e., one for the 
states: the federal government had no jurisdiction. This decision of the 
United States Supreme Court was "reversed" through the ratification of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which ban slavery 
and expressly grant Congress jurisdiction to enact implementing legisla-
67. The life expectancy in the United States is 75.5 years, just barely longer than in Great 
Britain (15.3 years), Denmark (75.4 years), Finland (75.0 years), Austria (74.4 years), and Germany 
and Belgium (14.8 years), and not far behind France (75.9 years), Sweden (77.1 years) and Norway 
(76.8 years). WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, THE 1993 INFORMATION PLEASE ENVIRONMENTAL 
AlMANAC 517,519,525,531,561,565, and 603 (1993). 
68. In the aftermath of the Dunblane massacre, in which Thomas Hamilton killed 16 
children and their teacher, the House of Commons passed legislation to ban all handguns above 
.22 caliber. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 20, 1996, at 25; 9 CAL. INT'L L. SEC. NEWSL. 14 
(1996/1997). Compensation for gun owners affected by the proposed ban on most pistols is 
expected to cost more than £ 100 million. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 16, 1996, at 12. 
69. Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires the consent of two-thirds of both houses of 
Congress to propose amendments, and the subsequent consent, by the legislature or by a 
convention, of three-fourths of the states for ratification. An amendment also can be proposed by 
a national convention called by Congress pursuant to the Application of the legislatures of 
two-thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
70. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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tion. 71 In a case from 1895 the Supreme Court declared the federal taxa-
tion of incomes to be unconstitutiona1.72 The federal income tax amend-
ment (Sixteenth Amendment) was ratified in 1913, relieving the consti-
tutional infirmity. The most recent example is a case73 ruling unconstitu-
tional a law which gave 18-year-olds the right to vote in state and local 
(in addition to federal) elections. That law was refashioned into the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified by the states in 1971. 
For many reasons, the likelihood of a constitutional amendment for 
gun control legislation, or even to grant the federal government a general 
police power, is quite low. Banning guns on school grounds or elsewhere 
does not have the moral legitimacy or federal urgency that, say, banning 
slavery did. Unlike with the income tax amendment, the federal govern-
ment would not be significantly benefitted by amendment to allow gun 
control legislation or to fight crime generally. In contrast to the IS-year-
old voting amendment, ownership of guns on school grounds and else-
where does not concern a basic democratic institution, such as voting. 
2. Passage of a New Law, Restricted to Commerce 
The Congress could also attempt to redraft the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act to fit into one of the three Lopez categories (channels of com-
merce, instruments of commerce, or substantial effect on interstate com-
merce). 
Weapons are not channels of commerce, like hotels, and therefore do 
not tit into the first category. To fit into the second category 
(instruments), Congress might forbid the import and export of weapons 
between the states and forbid the possession of a weapon manufactured in 
another state or country. The mere possession of a weapon is not an eco-
nomic activity and therefore will not fit into the third category (substan-
tial effect of an economic activity on interstate commerce). On the other 
hand, the sale of a weapon74 is a commercial activity. Basing its legisla-
tion on the commerce clause, Congress could constitutionally forbid both 
the sale and acquisition of a handgun, as well as the possession of a hand-
gun with the intent to sell it, since these activities are closely related to 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, quoted infra note 134. Amendment XV reads: 
SECTION I. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition or servitude. 
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
72. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
73. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
74. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 833 (1974) (upholding federal regulation 
of weapon sales under the commerce clause). 
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commerce. If the legislation sought a total weapons ban, then the prohibi-
tion against possession could probably be attached to the prohibition 
against sale, since a prohibition against sale would be practically unen-
forceable if it were not coupled with a prohibition against ownership.75 In 
other words, a federal prohibition against the ownership of weapons 
would probably be constitutional if it were coupled with a prohibition 
against sale. 
3. Incentive Programs 
In order to realize a nationwide prohibition of guns on school 
grounds, Congress could concentrate on those few states which still do 
not have prohibitory provisions in their penal codes. As mentioned 
above, 76 numerous states-almost 40-already forbid the possession of 
weapons on school grounds. In order to encourage further legislative ac-
tivity, Congress could employ the spending power by offering 
incentives77 to ensure the cooperation of the states. The most famous ex-
ample of this "cooperative federalism"78 is probably the uniform mini-
mum drinking age.79 It is necessary for the Congress to offer incentives 
because Congress lacks the power to dictate legislation to the state legis-
latures.80 
75. Actions for compensation for expropriation are outside the scope of this article. Compare 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (prohibition against commerce in partB of eagles held not 
to constitute a taking of property without compensation because possession was not prohibited) 
with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (closing of a brewery did not give rise to a claim 
for compensation because the sale of alcoholic beverages had been legislatively branded a 
"nuisance"). See Thomas Lundmark, Neueste Enteignungsrechtsprechung des US Supreme Court 
und ihre Bedeutung fUr das Naturschutzrecht, NATUR UND RECHf (appearing shortly). See also 
note 68, infra, mentioning the compensation provided for under new legislation in the United 
Kingdom that bans certain handguns. 
76. See infra note 114. 
77. Three days after the Court's ruling in Lopez, President Clinton announced plans lo 
introduce legislation that would encourage states to ban guns from school zones by linking Federal 
funds to enactment of school-zone gun bans. Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun 
Ban in School Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al. See Lundmark, infra note 109, at 421. 
78. The courts have often referred to Medicaid, and other federal welfare programs largely 
administered and implemented by states, as examples of "cooperative federalism." See, e.g., Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980); Douglas v. Babcock, 990 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); Washington Dep't of Social & Health Servs. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 
549, 557 (9th Cir. 1987); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (using the term 
"cooperative federalism" to dest.Tibe the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program); and 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (using the term 
to describe provisions of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act found constitutional). 
79. National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1994), upheld in South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that the spending power permit• Congress to condition 
highway funds on states' adoption of minimum drinking age). 
80. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a provision of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 202lb (Supp. 1992) 
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Il. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
According to the text of the commerce clause, the federal power over 
commerce extends to international commerce, to interstate commerce, 
and to commerce with the Indian tribes. 81 Power to regulate intrastate 
commerce therefore rests textually with the states. 82 
A. Early Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: The Thesis 
During the nineteenth century, federal courts employed the commerce 
clause, if at all, when the law of a single state was claimed to interfere 
with the interstate transportation and commerce in goods, for, stated gen-
erally, the commerce clause prohibits states from imposing unreasonable 
burdens upon interstate commerce. 
In order to decide these cases, federal judges had to define what was 
meant by "commerce" and by "interstate." According to the Supreme 
Court in 1824, commerce that was "interstate" was commerce which con-
cerned more states than one. 83 In other words, it presupposed a geograph-
ical transborder element. The judges of the federal courts employed a 
mercantile definition of commerce, holding that commerce consisted of 
buying and selling. 84 According to this definition, production, manufac-
turing, and mining were merely precursors of commerce, but not com-
merce themselves. Therefore, they could not be regulated by Congress 
under the commerce clause. 85 
This early construction of the commerce clause had the practical ef-
fect of legitimating the status quo. By construing the commerce clause in 
such a narrow fashion, the federal judges avoided having to declare 
countless laws of the state governments to be unconstitutional even 
specifying that a state that fails to provide for the disposal of all internally generated wa.~te 
becomes liable for all damages suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the state's failure 
take possession of the waste was an unconstitutional command to implement legislation enacted 
by Congress). This case is discussed at length, among other places, in Hazeltine, infra note 103, 
Levy, infra note 103, and Caminker, infra note 103. 
81. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, d. 3, quoted in supra note 7. 
82. Historically, the interstate commerce clause was intended to prevent Balkamzation and 
to encourage creation of a national market. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
Similar concerns motivated the formation of the European Common Market. See GEORGE A. 
BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUN!IY LAW 2 (1993); THOMAS C. 
FISCHER, THE EUROPEANIZATION OF AMERICA: W!IAT AMERICANS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 29 (1995) (reviewed in Thomas Lundmark, 45 AM. J. OF COMP. L. (1997)). 
83. Gibbo11~ v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
84. E.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) ("Contract.~ to buy, sdl, 
or exchange goods to be transported among the several States, the transportation and its 
instrumentalities . . . may be regulated, but this is because they form part of interstate trade or 
commerce"). 
85. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (describing development of commerce 
clause jurisprudence). 
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though they had or could have had a detrimental effect on interstate com-
merce. For example, in one case the federal judges held that a ferry mo-
nopoly was intrast8.te because the ferry never crossed a border,86 even 
though passengers and freight moved across state lines. In another case 
the Supreme Court ruled that brewing and packaging of intoxicating bev-
erages did not constitute buying and selling ("commerce"), but rather 
merely "production." Thus the states could forbid the production of alco-
holic beverages without doing violence to the commerce clause. 87 
The mercantile test for commerce survived into the late 19th century, 
which was a time of expanding federal preoccupation with commerce. 88 
As a result of this new federal legislative interest in commerce, the com-
merce clause became a handy weapon for attacks upon federal legislation. 
New federal regulations of production, manufacturing, and mining were 
held to be unconstitutional because, not being commerce, Congress had 
no power to regulate them. 
In one case, a federal agency sought to block the acquisition of a 
sugar refinery on the ground that its acquisition would give rise to a mo-
nopoly unlawful under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The federal judges 
theorized that the manufacture of sugar was a precondition of commerce, 
but not exactly commerce itself; as such, it could not be part of interstate 
commerce over which the federal government had jurisdiction. 89 The 
same reasoning was applied to the federal Child Labor Act, which for-
bade the transportation of goods manufactured with the help of child la-
bor. According to the Supreme Court at the time, manufacture was not 
commerce,90 at least not interstate commerce. The same reasoning was 
followed for mining. "Mining," according to the Court, "brings the sub-
ject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it"; and 
thus Congress could not legislate a nationwide minimum wage for min-
ers, because mining was not commerce.91 Even if mercantile commerce as 
86. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 573-575 (1853). In an earlier case, Gibbons had operated 
a passenger ferry between New York and New Jersey under a federal license. Ogden claimed that 
the federal license violated his monopoly, granted by the state of New York, over steamboat 
transportation between the two states. Because Gibbons' transportation of passengers took place 
between two states, i.e., it was transborder, it was held to constitute interstate commerce and to 
lie within the federal legislative jurisdiction. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
87. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17, 20-22 (1888). For an overview of constitutional 
questions regarding the regulation of alcohol, see Thomas Lundmark, Freiheit der Werbung und 
der Grundsatz der VerhaltnifJnUljJigkeit in der amerikanischen Rechtsprechung, 1994 
VERWALTUNGS-ARCH[V 522. 
88. Examples of federal legislation stemming from this time period include the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379; and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994)). 
89. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
90. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
91. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936). 
183] GUNS AND COMMERCE 197 
then defined was involved, the federal judges would differentiate between 
measures that directly (constitutionally) and indirectly (unconstitution-
ally) regulated commerce. Applying this ancillary test, the federal judges 
held a federal law setting maximum working hours and minimum wages 
for the poultry industry to be unconstitutional because the effects of the 
law on commerce were indirect, not direct. 92 
B. Recent Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: The Antithesis 
The great shift in the opinion of the Supreme Court came in 1937 
shortly after President Roosevelt announced his "Court Packing Plan."93 
According to Roosevelt's legislative plan, the number of judges on the 
Supreme Court was to be increased in order to ensure that younger 
judges-those sympathetic to Roosevelt's legislation-had a majority on 
the Court. Even though Roosevelt's plan was met with opposition in Con-
gress, the Court began backing down from its protection of the supremacy 
of the states in economic matters.94 
In the seminal opinion National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corporation95 the Supreme Court not only abandoned the 
direct-indirect test, it went further: Even intrastate activities were reach-
able by Congress under the commerce clause if they had such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control was essential 
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions. 
Using this new standard, the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 which, among other things, outlawed unfair em-
ployment practices such as firing employees for union activity. There fol-
lowed decisions which emphasized the cumulative effect of the regulated 
activity on commerce and interstate commerce. Following the lead of 
Congress, the Supreme Court so expanded the reach of the commerce 
clause that all activity could be regulated if it had some conceivable, if 
only cumulative, effect on an interstate transaction. Thus the Supreme 
Court upheld laws which forbade local, usurious credit transactions;96 
92. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (in which the Supreme 
Court declared the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1994), unconstitu-
tional, in part as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the executive without sufficient 
standards). 
93. On February 5, 1937, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a bill to reor-
ganize the federal judiciary. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The 342d Press Conference (Feb. 5, 1937), 
in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONSTITUTION 
PREVAILS 1937, 35, 49-50 (1941). 
94. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
SECOND CENTURY 235 (1990). 
95. 301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
96. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-156 (1971). 
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which prohibited discrimination in privately owned restaurants97 and ho-
tels98; which regulated the harvest and consumption of small quantities of 
wheat99 ; and which punished arson attacks on apartment buildings. 100 The 
Court even stopped calling production, manufacture, and mining a pre-
cursor to commerce. Indeed, one case exclusively concerned the regula-
tion of intrastate mining, yet the federal regulation was upheld on the 
strength of the commerce clause. 101 
Until the Lopez case, the commerce clause seemed not to limit Con-
gress's legislative prerogative in any way. Indeed, since the New Deal of 
the 1930's not a single piece of commerce clause legislation had been 
held unconstitutional for lack of jurisdiction. 102 Two textbook authors 
wrote in 1991: "The Supreme Court today interprets the commerce clause 
as a complete grant of power."103 
C. The Lopez Synthesis 
In 1992 a twelfth grader came to school in San Antonio, Texas, with 
a concealed pistol. He was promptly charged with violation of a law, en-
acted by the legislature of the state Texas, 104 which forbade possession of 
a gun on the grounds of a school. The following day the complaint 
against him in the state court was dismissed, and he was charged by the 
federal grand jury with violation of a federallaw. 105 According to the fed-
eral Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,1°6 it is a federal crime know-
ingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has rea-
sonable cause to believe, is a school zone. 107 
97. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964). 
98. Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
99. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
100. Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985). 
101. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
102. The l~t case declaring a commerce clause regulation unconstitutional for want of federal 
legislative jurisdiction was Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railway Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
103. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD 0. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (4th ed. 1991). 
"For almost four decades after 1937, the conventional wisdom was that federalism in general--and 
the rights of states in particular--provided no judicially-enforceable limit~ on congressional power." 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 378 (2d ed. 1988). See also 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLrfiCAL SEDULIION OF THE LAW 158 (1990); 
ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 162 (1990); William A. 
Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Restriction on Congressional Power Vis-a- Vis the 
States?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (1994); Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on 
the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal 
Power, 41 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1993); and Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: 
May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1001 
(1995). 
104. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(l) (Supp. 1994). 
105. Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). 
106. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). 
107. A school zone is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) as "in, or on the grounds of, a 
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The public defender moved to dismiss the criminal indictment on 
grounds of federalism, arguing that Congress has no power to regulate 
schools. 108 Education, the defense lawyer argued, belongs traditionally to 
the jurisdiction of the several states of the United States, or to state or 
local agencies, usually school districts. 109 The trial court rejected this 
argument, but the young man prevailed before the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals 110 and before the Supreme Court. The federal law under which 
he was convicted was held unconstitutional for lack of federal legislative 
jurisdiction. 
The dissenting opinions in Lopez of Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, 
and Ginsburg apply the expansive definition of commerce that had be 
used for the past 50 years: any activity can be commerce. The dissenting 
opinion of Stevens provides a good example of this (antithetical) reason-
ing: 
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can 
be used to restrain commerce. Their possession is the 
consequence, either directly or indirectly, of commercial 
activity. In my judgment, Congress' power to regulate 
commerce in firearms includes the power to prohibit pos-
session of guns at any location because of their poten-
tially harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress 
may also prohibit their possession in particular mar-
kets.lll 
public, parochial or private school [or] within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a 
public, parochial or private school." 
108. The constitutional right to bear arms, discussed supra note 41, is not mentioned in the 
164-page opinion of the Court in Lopez. 
109. Thoma.~ Lundmark, Die Bedeutung der Gliedstaaten im amerikanischen Veifassungs-
system, 1992 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 419. 
110. Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). 
111. Compare the legislative findings, adopted by Congress after the enactment of the 
legislation, found at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994): 
(l)(A) Crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a perva.~ive, 
nationwide problem; 
(B) Crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, 
guns, and criminal gangs; 
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been 
found in increasing numbers in and around schools, ... ; 
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts, 
ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably 
moved in interstate commerce; ... 
(G) ... [a] decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on 
interstate commerce . . . . 
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Having met the requirement of "commerce," the dissenting Justices tum 
to the issue that the commerce be "interstate." Here they join in the opin-
ion of Breyer, who, loyal to the antithetical position, argues as follows: 
violence in schools, including violence with weapons, hinders learning by 
the pupils, which in turn has an impact on interstate commerce because a 
good education is important in the job market, and job markets are inter-
state.112 
Of course schools play a very important role in society, but the rela-
tionship to commerce is weak and even a little insulting, since children 
are not sent to school solely or even predominately to serve commercial 
ends. Sometimes it is difficult to accept that the Congress can regulate 
something as ephemeral and banal as day-to-day commercial transaction, 
and not something as meaningful and lasting as a grade-school education. 
But this is exactly how the federal government was designed, the majority 
reasoned: the federal government was meant to augment the powers of 
the states, not the other way around. 
The Gun-Free School Zones Act, which was part of a larger legisla-
tive package, was signed by President George Bush under protest. He saw 
federal regulation as unnecessary and potentially disruptive to legitimate 
state regulation of the same subject matter. 113 And, in fact, almost 40 
states-including Texas, where the Lopez case arose-have such legisla-
tion on their books. 114 
112. As a law student notes, this argument would also support a federal ban on chewing gum 
in schools, because gum chewing hinders learning, which in tum has an impact on interstate com-
merce because a good education is important in the job markets. James M. Maloney, Note, 
Shooting for an Onmipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate 
Firearms Possession, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1826 (1994). 
113. "The policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, 
but they should not be imposed upon the States by the Congress." President's Statement upon 
Signing S. 3266, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
114. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE§ 62.1-02-05 (1985); 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912 (1983). 
After the Gun-Free School Zones Act was passed in 1990, many states amended existing laws or 
enacted similar bans. E.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 11.61.195(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-3102(A)(l2) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119(a)(2)(A) (Michie 1993); CAL. 
PENAL CODE§ 626.9 (Deering Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 18-12-105.5 (West Supp. 
1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217b (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.095 (West 
1994); GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-11-127.1 (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 18-3302C(l) (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/24-1 (a)(l2)(c)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95(A)(5) 
(West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, 6552 (West 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 36A (1992); MASS. GEN. L. 269 § lO(j) (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.66(1)(b)(l) (West 
Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17 (1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1)(8) (Vernon 
Supp 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 45-8-334 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.265.l(e) (1993); NJ. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5.e (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(3) (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 (1993); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN.§ 2923.122 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1280.1 (West Supp. 1994); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.370 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-60 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-23-420 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-32-7 (Supp. 1994); TENN. 
CODE ANN.§ 39-17-1309 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 46.03(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1994); 
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The judges in the majority of the Lopez case (Rehnquist, O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) agreed with the former President. In his 
opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist differentiates three 
types of commerce based laws. First, Congress may regulate the channels 
of interstate commerce, such as hotels. 115 Second, Congress can regulate 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
state commerce. Examples include safety measures for vehicles, even if 
they are not necessarily driven across state boundaries. 116 Third, federal 
legislative jurisdiction extends to certain activities having some relation 
to interstate commerce, or that affect interstate commerce in a particular 
way. This is where the synthesis is reached. Rehnquist reiterates the test 
for measuring the constitutionality of a commerce clause law: "Where 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained."117 First, the activity regulated 
must be economic, i.e., commercial. Second, this activity must have a 
substantial interstate effect, suggesting that a cumulative or theoretical 
effect alone might be insufficient. 118 
In the case of the Gun-Free School Zones Act only the third avenue 
of constitutionality comes into question, that of economic activities hav-
ing a substantial relation to interstate commerce, or substantially affect-
ing interstate commerce. Using Rehnquist's synthetic standard, 119 the case 
is easy to decide. Mere possession of a gun at school is not economic ac-
tivity. Congress therefore lacks jurisdiction to regulate this activity under 
the interstate commerce clause. 
D. Future Judicial Progression: Subsidiarity 
The magnitude of the fallout from the Lopez decision is not mathe-
matically quantifiable. More than 100 federal laws in the United States 
Code, including more that 25 criminal provisions, employ the words "af-
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4004 (Supp. 1993); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Michie Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.280 (West Supp. 
1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.605 (West Supp. 1993). 
115. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The anti-discrimination 
law at issue in the Heart of Atlanta case and other Civil Rights laws are not threatened by the 
reasoning of the Lopez decision because they fit into this category of the channels of commerce. 
116. Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). 
117. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (emphasis added). 
118. The second part of the test-substantial effect on interstate commerce-is technically 
a dictum because it was not necessary to the decision of the Court because the regulation at issue 
failed the first prong of the test. 
119. The absence of legislative findings, which was important to the Court of Appeals in 
declaring the law unconstitutional, was relatively unimportant to the United States Supreme Court, 
which agreed with the Government that Congress was not required to make formal findings on the 
substantiality of the influences on interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (1995). On the 
issue of findings in general, see Maloney supra note 112, at 1817. 
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fecting commerce" in defining the reach of the law. 120 In addition, many 
laws which are based on the commerce clause, including the Gun-Free 
School Zone Act, do not mention the commerce clause at all. Because of 
these facts, and because of the breadth of the topic, the following discus-
sion can make only observations of a general nature. 
Federal social programs-such as old-age benefits, 121 medical care 
for the poor, 122 and medical care for the aged and handicapped123-are 
based on the federal spending power124 and as such are not directly af-
fected by the Lopez decision. Federal anti-discrimination laws, even if 
based on the commerce clause, are not threatened by Lopez because they 
regulate the channels of commerce, such as hotels, restaurants, and the 
workplace. 125 Federal criminal law is concerned to a great extent with 
interstate and international crimes, such as drug smuggling, and crimes 
which employ the channels of commerce, including telephones and the 
post office. 126 Tax laws enjoy their own base of federal legislative juris-
diction, 127 even when employed as instruments of indirect regulation. 128 
Federal family law is a field in which the impact of Lopez has already 
been felt: a federal district court in Arizona129 has ruled that Congress 
exceeded its regulatory powers under the commerce clause in enacting 
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992,130 which establishes a national 
program to aid states in developing and implementing child support en-
forcement policies and procedures. m But other courts have upheld the 
Child Support Recovery Act as a constitutional exercise of Congress's 
commerce power. 132 Other family law legislation appears constitutional 
120. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1646 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The author's LEXIS-search 
revealed 112. 
121. Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § § 1395-1395ccc (1994). 
122. !d. §§ 1395-1395xx (Medicaid). 
123. !d. §§ 1396-1396u (Medicare). 
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, discussed supra notes 32 through 40. 
125. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). They may protect 
the constitutional right of interstate travel. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
Another basis of congressional empowerment is section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
126. See generally Beale, supra note 6, Brickey, supra note 6, and Kurland, supra note 6. 
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
128. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), rev'd on other grounds. THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 
99-16, p. 145 (1987). 
129. United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. 
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Ariz. 1995). 
130. 18 U.S.C. § 228 et seq. (1994). 
131. Discussed in Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1817 
(1995). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 19 IOWA 
L. REV. 1073, 1095-97 (1994) (examining federalism concerns). 
132. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. 
Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616-17 (W.D. Va. 1995); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 
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under Lopez either because it regulates the "channels of commerce,"133 
employs the grant of Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment134 to enforce that Amendment's prohibition of state discrimina-
tion, 135 or employs the spending power of Congress. 136 
The Lopez case will have little effect on the constitutionality of fed-
eral environmental legislation because most of the laws are not based ex-
clusively on the "affecting commerce" aspect of the commerce clause. If 
they are, then jurisdictional problems may arise in the application of an 
otherwise constitutional statute. The Clean Water Act seeks to control the 
discharge of pollutants into the "waters of the United States."137 Over-
zealous administrative extension of this territorial jurisdiction can bring 
invalidity of an action. 138 Another very important piece of environmental 
legislation, the Clean Air Act, is not affected by the reasoning of the 
Lopez decision because it employs a system of incentives to the states to 
entice them to prepare and enforce State Implementation Plans. 139 The 
Endangered Species Act can in part be considered an exercise of the 
power of the federal government to enter into treaties with foreign coun-
tries.140 Federal laws implementing treaties are binding on the states with-
out a separate ground of federal legislative jurisdiction.141 The National 
1327, 1329-30 (D. Kan. 1995). 
133. Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (1994) (making domestic 
abuse a federal crime when the perpetrator crosses state lines). 
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article." 
135. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 5115a 
(1994) (prohibiting state agencies from denying foster or adoptive placement~ solely on the basis 
of race). See also Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994) (that 
implements the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution (U.S. Const. art. IV) by extending 
full faith and credit standard to child custody determinations). See generally Walter W. Cook, The 
Power of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919). 
136. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107, 5116, 5118 (1994) 
(establishing comprehensive federal program directed toward the prevention and treatment of child 
abuse and neglect); Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1994) (establishing 
national program to aid states in developing and implementing child support enforcement policies 
and procedures); Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10418 (1994) 
(providing federal funding to states to address the problem of family violence). 
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1994). The discharge of dredged or fill material into 
navigable waters without a permit violates the Act, which defines "navigable waters" as "waters 
of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Corps of Engineers have adopted regulations defining "waters of the 
United States" to include numerous bodies of water including wetlands. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 
C.P.R. § 230.3(s). 
138. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993). 
139. See Thomas Lundmark, The Clean Air Act Today, 27 AMERICAN STUDIES NEWSLETTER 
I (1992). 
140. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
141. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). See generally Paul M. Orbuch & Thomas 
0. Singer, At Particular Risk, THE ENVIRON. FORUM, July-Aug. !995 at 28. 
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Environmental Policy Act, 142 like many federal environmental laws, af-
fects federal agencies and projects that are supported by federal funds, in 
other words, projects which would fall under Congress's spending 
power. 143 As such they are not affected by the Lopez decision. 
Other federal environmental laws, on the other hand, are exclusively 
based on the interstate commerce clause. Exemplary is the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,144 which dictates mining prac-
tices for open-space mining and requires restoration after mining. In 1981 
the Supreme Court145 upheld the constitutionality of the law despite the 
fact that it only indirectly (if at all) regulated interstate commerce. The 
Supreme Court would likely reach the same result today, because mining 
is a commercial activity with a substantial impact on interstate and for-
eign commerce. 
The political and judicial struggle regarding states' rights seems des-
tined, at least in the near future, to be dominated by the concepts and pre-
cepts of the commerce and the spending clauses. This is unfortunate, be-
cause the tradition, thinking, and terminology of commerce, spending, 
and economics do not lend themselves well to the present-day debate on 
federalism. For instance, the reason why school-ground guns do not seem 
to many to be an appropriate subject of federal regulation has nothing to 
do with commerce or the economy or federal spending but rather with the 
tradition of local supervision of education and with the conviction that 
local governance of education is preferable. 
According to one commentator, family law, like education, should 
remain "localized" under the commerce clause. 146 Another suggests that 
federal power over commerce ought only exist where there is special jus-
tification for it. 147 Without ever referring to it by name, both of these 
commentators, as well as many others, have articulated values underpin-
ning the European principle of subsidiarity. 
"Subsidiarity expresses a preference for governance at the most local 
level consistent with achieving government's stated purposes." 148 Exam 
142. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1994). 
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, discussed supra notes 32 through 40. 
144. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1994). 
145. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
146. Dailey, supra note 131, passim. See also Comment, Abusing the Power to Regulate: 
The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 935 (1996). See also Lopez, 
115 S. Ct. at 1634, (referring to "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local" (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 30 (1937))). Lopez does not 
succeed in making this distinction. McJohn, supra note 6, at 36. 
147. Donald H. Regan, How to Think about the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally 
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 passim (1995). Compare Bermann, infra 
note 148, at 452-53: "[S]ubsidiarity systematically places the burden of proof on the proponents 
of Community action." 
148. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Com-
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ples can found in the Constitution of Germany and in the Treaty of Rome, 
the "constitution"149 of the European Union. In Germany, the principle of 
subsidiarity finds potential150 application to a long list of subject matter 
areas, such as civil law, criminal law, weapons legislation, and welfare, 151 
in which the federal and state governments have concurrent jurisdiction. 
In these areas, the German Constitution circumscribes the federal legisla-
tive prerogative: 
(2) The federal government has legislative jurisdiction 
[in matters subject to concurrent jurisdiction] only to the 
extent that federal legislation is necessary because 
1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by legisla-
tion of individual states or 
2. the regulation of a matter by state law could impair 
the interests of other states or of the whole [of the 
people] or 
3. the protection of legal or economic uniformity 
demands it. 152 
The principle of subsidiarity enjoins institutions of the European Un-
ion to act in areas of concurrent jurisdiction "only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States."153 The new provision154 reads as follows: 
The Community shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objec-
tives assigned to it therein. 
munity and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339 (1994). Subsidiarity promotes the 
(sometimes overlapping) virtues of self-detellilination and accountability, political liberty, flexibility, 
preservation of identities, diversity, and respect for internal divisions of component states. /d. at 
340-43. The apparent purpose was to ease fears that greater legal and political integration of 
Europe would needlessly trample claims to self-governance and cultural diversity. /d. at 334. 
149. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 82, at 47. 
150. Perhaps because the principle of subsidiarity was imposed on the Germans by the Allies, 
it has never been taken seriously by the Federal Constitutional Court. See CURRIE, supra note I 03, 
at 42-49. 
151. Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland arts. 74 and 74a, I Bundesgesetzblatt 
I (1949), as amended. An English translation can be found at CURRIE, supra note 103, App., at 
370-72. 
152. Grundgesetz, supra note 151, art. 72 (translated by the author). An English translation 
can be found at CURRIE, supra note 103, App., at 369. 
153. Maastricht Treaty on European Union art. G(5), adding a new Article 3b to the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. O.J. C 224/1 (Aug. 31, 1992). The text of this treaty is also 
found as an appendix to BERMANN ET AL., supra note 82, at 246 (1995 SUPP.). 
154. The Treaty on European Union came into force on November I, 1993. BERMANN ET AL., 
supra note 82, at 2 (1995 Supp.). 
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In areas which do not fall within its exclusive com-
petence, the Community shall take action, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective<; of the 
Treaty. 155 
Professor Bermann' s splendid article on subsidiarity collects and in-
terprets expressions of subsidiarity found in the interstices of American 
institutions. 156 He finds few guarantees in the U.S. system that the federal 
government will act only when the states cannot or will not do so on their 
own. 157 Professor Bermann rejects the Tenth Amendment as a constitu-
tional anchor/ 58 but perhaps the "necessary and proper" clause159 might 
be read to embody subsidiarity. Or subsidiarity might be held to belong to 
penumbral states' rights a la the privacy rights of individuals. 160 Or per-
haps the Constitution will be amended, or the congressional mentality 
will so change that no amendment is necessary. In any event, the author 
senses that Lopez signals the emergence of a deeper synthesis, one that 
can be referred to as localism or subsidiarity. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
The Lopez decision is important because it announces and applies a 
new interpretation of the interstate commerce clause as a basis for federal 
legislation. Instead of employing the very narrow interpretation given the 
155. The final paragraph of the new Article 3b expresses what is commonly known as the 
principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality holds that "the individual should not 
have his freedom of action limited beyond the degree necessary for the public interest." Case 
11170, lnternationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorrat.~stelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1127, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255,256. See generally Derrick WYAIT 
& ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 89-91 (3D ED. 1993). The U.S. Constitution's 
"necessary and proper" clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, d. 18) is not read to impose any comparable 
limitation on Congress. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819). 
156. Bermann. supra note 148, at 406. 
157. !d. at 403. Professor Bermann's article preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, 
but does cite the opinion of the Court of Appeals. See id. at 417. 
158. "The Tenth Amendment, whose breadth lend~ it only a superficial resemblance to the 
principle of subsidiarity, simply cannot be read as subsidiarity's U.S. counterpart." !d. at 423. 
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, cl.18, mentioned in supra note 155. 
160. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (The "specific guarantees in the Bill 
of Right~ have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance''). 
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clause at the beginning of this century (referred to as thesis) or employing 
the extremely broad, antithetical interpretation of the last fifty years 
("everything is interstate commerce"), the Justices of the Supreme Court 
have settled on a synthesis: if economic activity substantially affects in-
terstate commerce, then the federal government may regulate that activity 
under the commerce clause. In addition, the means and instrumentalities 
of commerce remain subject to federal regulation. 
The Lopez decision's immediate impact on existing legislation will 
be minor. Few pieces of legislation will be declared unconstitutional. 
Therefore it is not to be expected that an attempt will be made to amend 
the Constitution to give Congress the power it lacked to enact the Gun-
Free School Zones Act. Even after the decision in Lopez, Congress can 
devote itself to legislative matters of more substance and importance161 
than a prohibition against school weapons. For many other pieces of fed-
eral weapons legislation--such as the machine gun prohibition and the 
waiting period law (Brady Bill)-are not threatened by the Lopez deci-
sion. Congress can still exercise its legislative jurisdiction to control wea-
pons. What is lacking is the political will, not the legislative jurisdiction. 
The reason for this is in part the fact that, for non-Black Americans, the 
murder and manslaughter rates in the United State.<> approximate those in 
Europe, which is believed by most to have much lower crime rates. 
The author perceives Lopez as a harbinger of a new movement to-
ward recognition of the virtues of local governance. Like its subsidiarity, 
its European counterpart, local governance or "localism" respects diver-
sity, and it promotes self-determination, accountability, and flexibility. 
How this movement will manifest itself remains to be seen. 
16 L There were very few prosecutions under the Gun-Free School Zones Act. See Note, 
Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of the Tellth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. 
LEGAL CoMMENT. 151 (1994). For another case that reached the appellate courts, see United States 
v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 2'l1 (9th Cir. 1993). 
